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 Life in the ant trails
Cocaine and caustic circuits in Bissau
Henrik Vigh
Abstract: Th is article looks ethnographically at the cocaine trade in and through 
Bissau, Guinea-Bissau. It clarifi es some of the less obvious aspects of illegal 
cross-border trade and ties the minor fl ow of drugs, oft en traffi  cked by the desper-
ate and disenfranchised, to larger global dynamics. While international media and 
commentators alike frequently depict transnational organized crime as a pathogen 
attacking the healthy global order, a closer look at the Bissau cocaine trade clari-
fi es that the trade is neither external nor parasitical but integral to it. Th e trade’s 
grasp of Bissau is anchored in enduring critical circumstance, stretching from the 
social to the political, and displays several ironic feedback loops and interdepen-
dencies linking misfortune in time and space. Th e article thus shows how negative 
conditions may travel and circulate in a manner that ramifi es vulnerability across 
economic and political borders.
Keywords: caustic circuits, cocaine trade, interdependency, transnational 
organized crime
In many ways, the cocaine trade in Bissau has 
come to saturate the city’s social and political 
environment. What used to be the sleepy capital 
of the small and geopolitically negligible West 
African country of Guinea-Bissau has acquired 
a rather spectacular presence within the past 
decade. Given the unfl attering title of Africa’s 
“fi rst narco-state” by the United Nations, the 
country has, in that time, made an extraordi-
nary number of headlines in international news. 
While many of these have been sensationalist, 
the fact remains that a large part of the cocaine 
traffi  cked into Europe, since the early years of 
the new millennium, has passed through the 
country’s territory. Th e substance has entered 
the country by air and sea from Brazil and been 
shipped and smuggled north toward the EU. In 
the process, Guinea-Bissau turned into a drug 
hub. What started as merely a transshipment 
point turned into a safe haven for the trading 
and traffi  cking of the drug. As the palms of 
the country’s military and political elite were 
greased and the services of the state bought by 
cartels and international and local drug entre-
preneurs, it became an important nexus within 
a billion-dollar trade (Vigh 2012). In the pro-
cess, the small country moved from being a 
place of no international interest to being seen 
as a major matter of geopolitical concern, a pest 
and pariah on the global order.
16 | Henrik Vigh
Th is article takes an ethnographic look at the 
cocaine trade in and through Bissau and criti-
cally probes our conventional understanding of 
such developments. While academics and com-
mentators oft en talk about transnational orga-
nized crime (TOC) as a pathogen or plague, 
simultaneously external to, but parasitical on, 
the global order, an ethnographic approach 
clarifi es the intrinsic nature of it. Th e notion of 
TOC being “the HIV of the international state 
system” (Sheptycki 2002: 15), the “perverse con-
nections” of the global (Castells 2010: 171), and 
the “uncivil” society among us (Annan 2000) 
paints a picture of cross-border crime as epiphe-
nomenal and exceptional to the “normal” state 
of aff airs, leading politicians and policy makers 
to imagine the solution to the problem can be 
found by leading “wars on,” “combatting,” and 
“exterminating” the phenomenon. However, 
rather than being external to the dominant glo-
bal order, TOC is, as we shall see, more plau-
sibly seen as contingent on the very same dy-
namics that defi ne the uneven distribution of 
wealth and power within that global order. In 
the discourse of epidemics that defi nes the pub-
lic imaginary on this issue, TOC is, we may say, 
not ecdemic but endemic to the current state of 
globality (cf. Comaroff  and Comaroff  2008).
In other words, the understanding of TOC as 
an external contamination of otherwise healthy 
societal states, may in many ways, be prevent-
ing us from gaining a clear understanding of the 
phenomenon and processes that cause it. Th at 
is not to say internal factors are unimportant or 
that Guinea-Bissau’s specifi c historical, political 
and geographical past has not played a signifi -
cant part in its drug-related development. Th e 
traces left  by the prolonged liberation war in the 
country—which, for the liberation movement, 
the Partido Africano para a Independência da 
Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), depended on 
para-state constructions and smuggling activi-
ties—may very well have singled it out as an in-
teresting point of connection for the cartels. Th e 
fact that the postcolonial state became a “sim-
ulacrum of social order” and democratic rule, 
under the autocratic control of former President 
João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, was clearly instru-
mental (cf. Comaroff  and Comaroff  2008: 11); 
equally, the country’s geographical proximity to 
the South American continent and its long and 
unpatrolled coastline make transportation and 
concealment manageable and add to its allure in 
smuggling terms. Yet, rather than exemplifying 
the way “the global” becomes infected from the 
outside in, the Guinea-Bissauan case appears 
to clarify the opposite. It shows how global dis-
parities may generate critical interdependencies 
that connect local diffi  culties to larger orders.
Th e remainder of this article will focus on 
two such interdependencies, the fi rst being of a 
social and transnational nature and the second 
of a political one. Th e focus on interdependency 
is obviously not novel and has been used in pol-
itics and systems theory to explain connections 
between events and developments that other-
wise seem unconnected (see, e.g., Young 1969). 
It can thus be further subdivided into economic, 
political, social, economic, and ecological inter-
dependencies (cf. Beck and Sznaider 2006: 11).1 
Positioned between the descriptive and the an-
alytical, the concept has critical potential, as it 
can be used to clarify how vulnerabilities con-
nect in social feedback loops. In this way, inter-
dependencies become caustic circuits, that is, 
circulations and fl ows that stitch the world to-
gether while simultaneously hollowing out and 
corroding the social environments and relations 
from which their origins. Allow me to start with 
an empirical description to elucidate the point.
A crackhead in a container bar
Joaozinho was searching for his piece of pedra, 
“rock,” the small amount of crack cocaine he 
had dropped from the makeshift  table where he 
had been sitting for the past couple hours. We 
were standing by a “container bar” in inner city 
Bissau. Th e bar, literally a shipping container 
with holes cut into the metal sides serving as 
windows to serve from, was a regular meeting 
place for the men of the neighborhood who 
were the focus of my research at the time.
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Th ough sitting alone, Joaozinho had been 
the center of attention for a while. Fluctuating 
from fi dgety to apathetic, his stoned presence 
had the quality of a performance. As his energy 
increased and decreased in tune with his intake, 
he was, at times, rambling and squirming only 
to stop and stare into the air a minute later. At 
this moment, he was putting all his eff orts into 
fi nding the rock that had fallen off  the table. 
Th ough it was out of sight, his desire to smoke 
it remained potent, and in an attempt to fi nd, 
it he bent down, lit his lighter with one hand, 
and slowly swept the fi ngers of his other hand 
through the dry red dirt beneath him. As he lit 
the lighter, the handful of guys I was standing 
with burst out laughing. We had been at the 
bar for about an hour, and his erratic conduct 
had periodically interrupted our conversation 
and made the group marvel at his spectacularly 
coked-up ways. His attempt to illuminate the 
dirt beneath his feet to locate his lost cocaine 
was the last straw, leaving people unable to con-
tain their laughter.2 Th e issue was not that he 
was using his lighter in this way but rather that 
he was doing so in the middle of the day. Th e 
container bar had opened around noon, and 
being on a 24-hour bender, he was oblivious to 
the available daylight at hand. As he heard peo-
ple laugh, he tilted his head—still between his 
legs—and looked up at the source of the noise.
Joaozinho was, at the time, one of a small 
but growing number of, primarily, young men 
who had become crack cocaine users in Bissau. 
When I fi rst came to the city, around the turn 
of the millennium, cocaine addiction was the 
exception. Th e civil war had just ended, and 
though there were rumors of cocaine traffi  cking 
in the country even then, the drug was primar-
ily mentioned in relation to the many confl icts 
elsewhere on the Upper Guinea Coast. Th e sub-
region was, at the time, home to an array of civil 
wars—from Casamance to Liberia, in which the 
gruesome behavior of young combatants was 
rumored to have been stimulated by the use of 
brown-brown, an alleged mixture of cocaine 
and gunpowder. Th e substance was believed to 
increase the eff ect of the cocaine, decrease fear, 
and boost the fi ghting capacity of children and 
youths (for a fi rst-person account, see Beah 
2006), as the extraordinary addition of smoke-
less gunpowder would potentiate the cocaine 
due to the nitroglycerin-induced vasodilation.
Combining the transgressions of war with 
the excesses of drugs, the idea of brown-brown 
was symbolically potent. It consequently made 
excellent gossip, most probably exaggerating the 
actual extent of the problem.3 A handful of years 
later, however, much larger and purer quantities 
of cocaine were the talk of the town. Around 
2005, a large part of the cocaine consumed in 
Europe started passing through the country, 
commencing a turbulent drug economy in the 
otherwise fi nancially and politically devastated 
place. Before that, the pipe, or cachimbo, had 
been used for tobacco and pot (yamba and to-
bacco di iran, or “spirit tobacco,” as the latter is 
jokingly called in Bissau). With the infl ux of co-
caine, and its byproduct crack cocaine, termed 
pedra or quisa, the crack pipe became an addi-
tion to the urban environment. Currently, crack 
is easily found in Bissau and dealt openly in the 
areas of Reno and Caracol. Th e marketplace in 
the latter area is commonly nicknamed aero-
porto di caracol, “Caracol airport.” While this 
once referred to the place as a venue for buying 
cheap cashew wine and spirits, which would lift  
people out of their misery, it presently supplies 
a “high” of a diff erent order.
Circuit 1: Feeding dependency
Joaozinho’s story ties into the development of 
the trade in several ways. Besides the absurdity 
of the aforementioned situation, indicating how 
far from shared reality his drug use had brought 
him, his addiction illuminates a set of ironic 
feedback loops related to recent developments 
in the city. Th e story, as we shall see, clarifi es 
some of the social dynamics at stake, moving 
us from social obligation to intoxication. I ini-
tially knew him through his uncle Raul. Raul 
was one of a group of militiamen, the Aguentas, 
I have followed in and outside Guinea-Bissau 
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since the turn of the millennium. As with many 
of the Aguentas, he was one of the urban poor, 
from the ethnic group of Papels,4 who had at-
tached themselves to the political faction built 
around former President Vieira. A former sol-
dier during the liberation struggle,5 Vieira tran-
sitioned in his 40-year political career from war 
hero to Afro-Marxist dictator, democratically 
elected president, warlord, and drug lord. Raul 
followed Vieira in moving from confl ict to co-
caine. He belongs to the generation of youth 
that came of age around the turn of the millen-
nium in Bissau and grew up during a period of 
structural adjustment programs, economic cri-
sis, and political confl ict in the country. In an at-
tempt to gain security, he joined the Aguentas in 
1998, serving as a presidential guard for Vieira. 
In the following years, he was repeatedly mo-
bilized and demobilized and ended up engag-
ing in the transnational movement of cocaine 
through Guinea-Bissau.
As I spent time in Bissau, Raul came to be 
one of my closest interlocutors. He lived with his 
mother and nephew in an adobe house with a 
corrugated iron roof and a small quintal, a yard, 
that led to a latrine shared by the surrounding 
houses. Th e family was poorer than most and, 
being the eldest man in the household, the obli-
gation to support them fell on Raul (Vigh 2016). 
Yet living in one of the world’s poorest coun-
tries, where jobs are few and far between, and 
having lost the support of the political network 
he had aligned with in 1998 as a result of it los-
ing the war in 1999 and 2009, he was incapable 
of doing so. As with many of my interlocutors—
and young disenfranchised men in general—he 
lived the social strain of being expected to be a 
breadwinner while stuck in a desperate socio-
economic position where that was all but im-
possible (Agnew 1992; Merton 1957; see also 
Vigh 2006, 2009).
Th e ant trail
Seeking to better his situation, Raul managed to 
migrate to Europe in 2010. He did so by con-
necting to the remnants of the network he had 
fought for during the war and had subsequently 
lost. Th ough the network had been decapaci-
tated in 2009 by the murder of its prime fi gure—
the late Vieira—the remnants of the network 
remained infl uential through the role it played 
in relation to the cocaine trade passing through 
the country. Th e trade had grown explosively af-
ter the return of Vieira in 2005 (see Vigh 2016), 
when smaller quantities of cocaine began trick-
ling into the local networks that facilitate the 
larger-scale smuggling activities of the cartels 
through the country. As the substance entered 
into these local networks, they would accumu-
late the drug and traffi  c it in the form of cabaças, 
literally “heads,” that is, kilos of cocaine, or by 
further subdividing it into dedos, “fi ngers” in 
Creole,6 as capsules of cocaine to be swallowed 
and carried to Europe by drug “mules” (ngull-
idurs) or “swallowers,” fi nally to be sold as ngal-
las, one-gram packets of the drug, in Europe.
Th e primary, large-scale fl ow of cocaine 
through the country thus creates a secondary 
one that feeds into an “ant trail,” a fl ow of smug-
glers sent as mules, traffi  cking lesser quantities 
or facilitating sales and redistribution within 
the EU. I have written about the specifi cs of this 
elsewhere and lack the space to do so again here 
(Vigh 2009, 2016, 2018). Th e important point is 
that, while Guinea-Bissau has little in terms of 
natural resources, it has plenty in terms of peo-
ple desperate enough to risk their lives for the 
possibility of getting a better one. For the disen-
franchised, such as Raul, the cocaine trade pro-
vides a means of escape from poverty through 
the prospect of becoming a migrant. Th e “drug 
road,” caminho di droga, as the movement of 
drugs is called in Bissau, may thus defi ne both 
the “corporate” shipment of tonnage by the car-
tel, the movement of kilos by local networks, as 
well as the microscopic drizzling of cocaine into 
Europe carried by people seeking migration, 
livelihoods, and better lives.
For Raul, the caminho di droga was a way of 
moving out and up. He faced the risks head-on 
as the opportunity presented itself. “Bissau is 
sweet, but poverty breaks (darna) people,” he 
told me in an interview, as his continuous in-
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ability to support those he was expected to hol-
lowed out his social personhood (Vigh 2016, 
2017). Th e precariously gendered position is 
a common one. While much has been written 
about vulnerable masculinities in an African 
context (cf. Abbink 2005; O’Brien 1996; Rich-
ards 1995; Utas 2003), little of this attention has 
been given to transnational crime and crimi-
nalization: a focus that interestingly highlights 
how such gendered vulnerabilities connect in 
high-risk livelihoods and become part of emerg-
ing global developments and precarious circu-
lations. As a result, traffi  cking is seen by many 
disenfranchised urban men in Bissau to provide 
the possibility of escaping the social and phys-
ical diffi  culties of being a poor man, um algin 
coitado, and moving toward a positive mascu-
line position as a migrant in Europe able to send 
back remittances.
Raul traveled to Europe, via Dakar, with his 
guts full of drugs. Despite the ordeal of swallow-
ing the goods, the fear of being caught, and the 
possibility that the parcels would rupture in his 
bowels, the actual trip had been a smooth one 
where everything was arranged for him and pa-
pers and passport were taken care of. Further-
more, being a mule has the benefi t of having a 
livelihood included, as the people who get in-
volved are oft en given the chance of dealing the 
goods they have been part of traffi  cking once 
they arrive in Europe. On closer inspection, this 
kind of migration is, obviously, ungenerous. 
Not only does it involve a hazardous journey, 
but also undocumented or irregular Guinea-
Bissauan migrants commonly reside at the very 
bottom of their unwilling European host soci-
eties. Poorly educated and without proper pa-
pers, they survive through so-called 3-D jobs 
seeking to make a living as day laborer’s doing 
work that is “dirty, dangerous and degrading” 
(Fong 1994). Th e “illegal” job market is steeped 
in uncertainty and insecurity. Th e risk of injury 
is frequently present just as people are regularly 
cheated of their pay or only paid a fraction of 
what was promised. Th e alternative to such licit 
yet illegal jobs is to move more fully into the 
criminal economy and sell the drugs that one 
has been part of traffi  cking. As both lie within 
the realm of the clandestine and illegal, deal-
ing drugs appears less transgressive for my in-
terlocutors than one might expect. It is most 
commonly spoken of as just another (bad) job 
and, rather than being seen as a drastic fall 
from grace, is perceived as a horizontal move 
from one kind of criminalized employment to 
another.
In general, many undocumented sub-Saharan 
Africans appear less convinced that they have 
traveled from periphery to center. Despite their 
physical mobility, they commonly talk of their 
lives as stuck at the bottom of a society—a so-
ciety now only more global in scope. Similarly, 
most of my interlocutors live a life of double il-
legalization in Europe. Th ey are criminalized in 
terms of both status and livelihood, and their 
statutory illegality prevents them from being 
able to move on in life. However, what is expe-
rienced as a state of exclusion in Europe po-
tentially gives way to a process of inclusion in 
Bissau. Th ey endure being unwanted and crimi-
nalized in order to gain respect and recognition 
in Bissau as people who can send occasional re-
mittances, or have the potential to do so. People 
in Bissau oft en know when migrants are caught 
up in the trade, yet the ethical evaluation of such 
entanglement is commonly related to the way 
money is spent rather than the way it is earned. 
Moving into the ant trail is morally evaluated 
not so much in terms of the nature of the liveli-
hood but in terms of the remittances sent home.
Raul was constantly on the lookout for a se-
cure job, um trabadju certo, but would spend 
most of his time dealing cocaine from the street 
corner in Lisbon, where I did my fi eldwork in 
2012 and 2015. It was unglamorous work, char-
acterized by a lack of the cash that is associated 
with it in the public imagination. Yet, though 
he would work long nights, struggling to make 
any money at all, he would nonetheless send a 
part of his meager earnings back to his family in 
Bissau. He complained bitterly about the end-
less requests placed on him, but the few times 
he would announce he had sent money to his 
nephew or mother an element of pride would 
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shine through. In such situations, the ant trail 
and its concomitant dealing will oft en be spo-
ken about as commercio so, “just business,” and 
remittances commonly be allocated according 
to underlying kinship obligations. Th e Papels, 
Raul’s ethnic group, are matrilineal and avun-
culocal. From a kinship perspective, tradition-
ally the most important person for Raul was his 
mother’s oldest brother, a person now deceased, 
just as the person who offi  cially looks aft er his 
interest while he is away is his eldest sister’s old-
est son, the young man Joaozinho.
Contemptible addiction
As Raul worked nights selling relief to addicts 
and partygoers in Lisbon, parts of the remit-
tances he sent home were, in other words, being 
used to feed Joaozinho’s growing addiction. Th e 
very same substance that granted Raul in ab-
sentia social status in Bissau, as a migrant pro-
viding for his family, was steadily undermining 
Joaozinho’s health, social standing, and the very 
same family’s reputation back home. “Th is one 
is worth nothing (Es ka bali nada),” Ido said of 
Joaozinho as we passed him by while walking 
through the neighborhood. For Ido, a person 
who could aff ord to eat only once a day and 
whose life was constantly focused on fi nding 
the next meal, Joaozinho’s addiction was almost 
contemptible. Joaozinho had the good fortune 
to get money from abroad. All he had to do 
was to redistribute it relatively fairly, and he too 
would be known as a patron in his own right. 
Instead of doing so, he was seen to “eat,” kume, 
the money intended for others. Ki banditto, “the 
bandit,” people in the bairro would remark of 
him, criminalizing not the money received but 
Joaozinho’s management of it.
Joaozinho was, in other words, seen as using 
money made from criminal dealings in immoral 
ways. While Raul had suff ered the predicament 
of not being able to achieve positive social sta-
tus in Bissau and had engaged in high-risk mi-
gration to improve his social standing—even if 
doing so came at the cost of living a life at the 
very bottom of European society—Joaozinho 
blatantly disregarded any demands placed on 
him. Raul’s life was enslaved by social obliga-
tion; Joaozinho’s addiction made him immune 
to it. Th e former used the cocaine trade to mend 
his poverty-derived social failures; the latter was 
seen as a social failure because of his misman-
agement of cocaine-derived means.
While it is commonly held that cocaine—
especially crack—is a drug industry that preys 
on the poor (cf. Baumer 1994), Bissau actually 
provides an example of the disenfranchised 
oft en being too impoverished to develop an 
addiction. Certainly, people who are addicted 
become impoverished by their cravings, at times 
resulting in other kinds of crime and prosti-
tution (yet another kind of interdependency). 
But the people I know with cocaine or crack 
addictions in Bissau are mainly people with 
access to resources. And these resources oft en 
stem from remittances. Crack is cheaper than 
powdered cocaine and may be available for as 
little as a 1,000 West African francs a hit (ap-
proximately 1.50 euros), yet the high it provides 
is notoriously short-lived, making it a drug that 
oft en leads to binge abuse and an expensive ad-
diction in the long run. It quickly becomes out 
of reach for the poorest parts of the population 
who are struggling to survive as it is. “It is not in 
the countryside that people are crying of hunger 
(chora fome),” Carlos, a young man from the city, 
told me. “It is inside the city proper,” he contin-
ued, describing the state of urban poverty in the 
capital as particularly brutal. For these people, 
like Joaozinho, the possibility of addiction is, in 
other words, ironically made possible through 
feeding other peoples’ addiction in Europe.
Joaozinho’s story clarifi es an array of interde-
pendencies that critically and paradoxically in-
tersect. Members of Raul’s household in Bissau 
would curse Joaozinho and complain about him 
not distributing goods and money adequately, 
and Raul would scold him on the phone and 
threaten to withhold further transactions, yet 
he continued channeling money toward him as 
Joaozinho’s standing refl ected on his own. Th e 
case provides an interesting example of a “caus-
tic circuit,” an ironic feedback loop that under-
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mines the very forces upholding it. Circuits, in 
this sense, refer to the circular movement of 
people and remittances (Cole and Groes 2016), 
while caustic directs our attention to the corro-
sive nature of the cocaine trade, nested within 
larger formations and fl ows of capital and pro-
cesses of extraction. Caustic also connects to the 
drug itself. It is an alkaloid, and while it brings 
elation in the moment, its properties disinte-
grate bodies, lifeworlds, and social relations. It 
spurs an aporic movement between the poten-
tial and the depleted. Th e trade that supports 
and socially substantiates Raul in terms of fam-
ily obligation and standing comes to undermine 
and hollow out the family he feels obliged to. 
Yet, the cocaine trade in Bissau is also tied to a 
higher-level interdependency.
Circuit 2: Dependency’s backlash
Th ough cocaine on the Upper Guinea Coast has 
been tied to primarily combatants and confl icts 
in the 1990s, the trade has a longer history in the 
region (cf. Ellis 2009). Th e substance was part 
of fi nancing and furthering the wars in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire and the current 
crisis in Mali (cf. Gberie 2013), but it has had a 
less remarkable presence within the regions’ pol-
ities, economies, and confl icts for a couple de-
cades. Likewise, the drug’s presence in Guinea-
Bissau exceeds what is commonly presumed 
(by, e.g., Chabal and Green 2016). Th is becomes 
more evident if we move from the lowest link 
in the trade—Joaozinho as a local consumer 
and Raul as a local traffi  cker—to one of the 
highest—the late Vieira. Th e president amassed 
parts of his enormous fortune by facilitating the 
traffi  cking of cocaine through the country. Co-
operating with a Lebanese contact who served 
as his security adviser and—allegedly—with the 
Italian Mancuso group, the cocaine trade can 
be tied to Vieira from the early 1990s with the 
initial setup of the business on Ilha de Maio, an 
island within the Bijagós archipelago. However, 
though the trade has a longer history in the 
country, the infl ux and availability of cocaine in 
Bissau exploded in 2005, drastically increasing 
its scope.
Th e infl ux of cocaine was, at the time, the 
last episode in a turbulent yet constant process 
of decline in the country. Guinea-Bissau had be-
come increasingly marginal since its indepen-
dence. Being a small Lusophone enclave within 
a larger francophone area of interest, with no 
natural resources to speak of and little strate-
gic signifi cance, the country quickly became, 
as a postcolony, irrelevant to the geopolitically 
dominant orders and economies. While PAIGC 
and its leader, Amilcar Cabral, had been hailed 
as visionary and progressive during the inde-
pendence struggle, the country was met with 
indiff erence once it ceased to be a proxy battle-
ground for the Cold War powers. Independence 
came, in this manner, to embody a move from 
progressive to regressive—from being a space of 
visionary politics to becoming one of economic 
and political decline and irrelevance (see Vigh 
2009). Th ough the country came into existence 
with a clear aim of staying independent in both 
political and economic terms, it had, 30 years 
on, drift ed into a state of dependency and was 
rapidly heading toward one of abandonment.
Initially the country sought to secure a vi-
able foundation for a socialist state through 
strengthening its self-suffi  ciency and social foun-
dations. From Cabral’s (1973) perspective, in-
ternational capitalism had rigged the system 
against the struggling postcolonial states. Even 
if it granted former colonies their freedom, the 
West maintained control of global trade leading 
to the continuous pauperization of the postco-
lonial state. In such a case, freedom was merely, 
Cabral argued, liberation toward unremitting 
exploitation, and to avoid such dependency, he 
envisioned a self-sustaining country with an 
agricultural sector strong enough to feed the 
country’s population and a social system vital 
enough to secure the growth of the coming 
generations. Cabral was assassinated just before 
independence, and instead of emerging as a vi-
able self-governing and self-sustaining polity, 
Guinea-Bissau turned into a country that was 
fully dependent on the goodwill of international 
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society to survive as a viable sovereign body at 
all. “Precarity” etymologically means “obtained 
by prayer”; it can be seen as defi ning of a state of 
aff airs where one has merely what one begs for, 
and exactly this came to characterize the coun-
try’s position in the international order as it be-
came entrenched in a negative spiral of loans, 
rents, and handouts.
While it lost its ability to sustain itself, the 
country gained a brutal political makeup. In-
stead of becoming a soft  socialist state, it turned 
into an Afro-Marxist dictatorship and politico-
military oligarchy under the ruthless control 
of Vieira, who turned it into one of Africa’s 
poor est and himself into one of the continent’s 
wealthiest. In place of self-suffi  ciency, it became 
a place where 87 percent of the population re-
port commonly going hungry (CPAN 2016) 
and where schooling and health services are all 
but nonexistent. Instead of gaining indepen-
dence, it became geopolitically abandoned: at 
fi rst, fully dependent on international aid and, 
later, having a large part of this economic assis-
tance withdrawn in the years following the civil 
war in 1998 and 1999 (from $180,770 million in 
1996 to $66,760 million in 2005) (Einarsdottir 
2007; WB 2019). In other words, not only was 
Guinea-Bissau in a state of regression, but the 
decline was further aggravated by the fact that 
90 percent of the state budget was dependent on 
aid at the same time as it was witnessing severe 
donor fl ight (Horta 2007), leaving the country 
struggling to pay civil servants and secure even 
the most basic necessities for its citizens.
Abandonment and alternative connectors
Amid the general downturn, the withdrawal of 
aid was experienced as an act of desertion. E de-
jano (Th ey have left  us behind),” I was told, as a 
testimony to the feeling of “abjection” that char-
acterized public sentiment (Ferguson 1999). Th e 
mood was, as we have seen, one of having been 
abandoned. It was perceived as a withdrawal and 
withholding of aid by those who ought to inter-
vene, making it a negative deed. Th e non-act 
became an act in its own right. Th e experience 
of decline and abjection turned into desperation 
in the city, with the military and politicians frac-
tionalized in brutal competition for insuffi  cient 
funds and the population struggling to survive 
in the mix of insecurity and poverty. However, 
when Vieira came back to the country in 2005, 
things started to change. Striking a deal with the 
military factions that had ousted him only a few 
years earlier, Vieira bought his way back into 
the presidency via a cocaine connection and the 
prospects of the political and military elite prof-
iting from transnational organized crime. Th e 
cocaine business settled rapidly and drastically 
in the country from 2005 onward. Th e combi-
nation of being poor, out of sight, and institu-
tionally weak made the country a perfect match 
for criminalized trade within the global order. 
As a political entity, perpetuated by persistently 
high levels of poverty and corruption, the coun-
try opened up to the cocaine cartels, seeking 
novel transshipment points for the traffi  cking 
of cocaine into the expanding European market 
(Vigh 2009, 2014, 2018).
Abandonment becomes, in this manner, a 
mode of power whereby the international soci-
ety denies a certain kind of politics. It is an act 
performed on states seen to lack transparency, 
accountability, order, or centralized bureau-
cratic control. Ironically, while international 
commentators mostly commonly describe the 
state in Guinea-Bissau as “weak” or “failed,” the 
combination of abandonment and fragmenta-
tion actually made it functional in terms of facil-
itating the illegal movement of people and goods 
through it. Within the criminalized cocaine 
trade, abject people and places becomes pivotal. 
As the navy became engaged in facilitating the 
movement of drugs, the army in protecting and 
storing drugs, and the police in punishing those 
who did not comply, the various remnants of 
the state adapted impeccably to smuggling ac-
tivities and the redistribution of spoils.7 In other 
words, while the trade made a handful of “big 
men” wealthy, and minor quantities of cocaine 
would trickle through local networks, the cartels 
gained, in return, invisibility and the protec-
tion of a vacant sovereignty whose alternative 
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makeup was perfectly suited to the smuggling 
of goods within the global order.
Guinea-Bissau became in this manner a 
geopolitical example of “central marginality”—
an entity that turns so economically and po-
litically marginal that it becomes central for 
something else, namely illegalized transnational 
fl ows. It became a margin in the middle, as a 
place stitched onto the global order by caustic 
circuits. Th e poverty of Guinea-Bissau, and the 
unsettled frailty of the political order, connected 
perfectly with growing cocaine production in 
Latin America and its increasing use in Europe.8 
In other words, the geopolitical abandonment 
aligned with the criminalized nature of the co-
caine industry and the disenfranchisement of 
the urban poor in the country. Th ese new de-
velopments brought hope to the people on the 
streets of the city. As Kio told me, “if you know 
someone who trusts you, you can see a ticket 
and all (bu na odja billhete e tudo)” (Vigh 2016: 
98), even if, as shown, the possibility presented 
is oft en one that disappoints in the long run.
Conclusion
Looking ethnographically at the drug trade in 
and through Guinea-Bissau highlights how co-
caine connects people and places through crit-
ical circulations. Th e transnational movement 
of the drug clarifi es some of the interdependen-
cies that sustain it. In this way, the case brings 
nuance to the divide between the central and 
the peripheral in the contemporary state of 
globality. It shows how one of the most geopo-
litically marginal spaces in the world, the state 
of Guinea-Bissau, gains centrality within the 
transnational movement of drugs and comes to 
pivotally connect three continents in an alter-
native movement of people, goods, and capital. 
Th e country’s abandonment makes it “a margin 
in the middle” as an example of expedient in-
signifi cance. Similarly, the lowly status and lack 
of life chances that characterize the urban dis-
enfranchised make them the core components 
of a larger movement of people and goods that 
turns migration into circulation, creating an ee-
rie feedback loop of poverty and addiction.
Th ough relegated to the shadows of the 
global, the drug trade is, thus, not external to 
the current world order but rather departs from, 
connects with, and profi ts from the zones of 
abandonment within it. Th is example shows that 
postindependence Guinea-Bissau developed 
into a country so ruined that it became a vacant 
sovereignty in which the drug cartels were able 
to hide and facilitate their business under the 
protection of, rather than in opposition to, the 
remnants of state. In similar terms, the disen-
franchisement of the urban poor came to supply 
the workforce for the “ant trail.” Initially the co-
caine trade was treated with relative optimism 
in Bissau. It was seen as an opening in a space of 
social and political closure. Currently, however, 
engagement with it has become less optimistic. 
With the swelling number of deportees, the in-
ternational arrest of some of the country’s key 
political and military fi gures as drug kingpins, 
and the sting of its feedback loops, people have 
become cautious of the trade. Life in the ant 
trail is increasingly recognized to be life in the 
entrails.
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Notes
 1. In relation to TOC more generally, the concept 
has equally been used to focus on the relation 
between members and groups, chains of supply 
and demand, and formations and fl ows (Benson 
and Decker 2010).
 2. Th e phenomenon is termed hen picking within 
crack cocaine consuming circles.
 3. I have conducted more than 10 years of off -
and-on fi eldwork with people affi  liated with the 
Aguenta militia in Bissau, who were rumored 
to have used it in the civil war in Guinea-Bissau, 
without being able to substantiate the allegations.
 4. Th e Papel/Papelis constitute the ethnic group 
indigenous to the area of Bissau. It is the 
fourth-largest ethnic group in in the country 
with approximately 9.1 percent of the population.
 5. Th e war against the Portuguese colonial power 
from 1963 to 1974.
 6. A fi nger weighs, I was told, approximately fi ve 
grams. Th e name apparently being derived from 
the shape of the packet to be swallowed or be-
cause they are rumored to be made from the 
cut-off  fi ngers of surgical gloves.
 7. Th e level of involvement of state institutions 
became clear with the arrest of the rear admi-
ral and a range of other top offi  cials in a DEA 
drugs bust just outside Guinea-Bissauan terri-
torial waters in 2013. Th e investigation further 
incriminated the country’s president at the time, 
Nhamadjo, and the head of the army, Indjai.
 8. In 1998, the value of the cocaine market in 
Europe was one-quarter of the US equivalent. 
Twenty years later, they are on a par (EMCDDA 
2018; Parkinson 2013).
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